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The subject of this three-part project is poetry. More specifically, the project is a 
collection of thoughts about poetry, the language of poetry, and poetry-as-philosophy.  
In its introductory section can be found a description of two competing accounts 
of language: referent theory, and meaning-is-use. While the latter seems a more complete 
picture on the whole, or so I assert, one must wonder: does it account for all the ways we 
use language? Specifically, can it account for the language of our main subject—poetry? 
I assert not. In this vein, the second part of the project attempts to do what I claim 
should not be done by asking three questions of the language of poetry; namely, whether 
or not the sentences in poetry are statements, whether or not they can be bearers of truth-
value, and whether or not they are meaningful. The chapter concludes with the claim that 
to ask these questions is to misunderstand the nature of poetry. Instead of asking these 
questions of poetry, I suggest that we might instead ask ourselves if perhaps we aren’t 
mistaken about what these sorts of questions may accomplish—and not just in connection 
with poetry. 
In the project’s third section, I ask, “When it comes to philosophy, is it possible 
that our current methodology does not actually serve the purpose it was designed for? Or 
could it be that this purpose is itself misguided?” In this chapter I assert the latter and 
consider an alternate methodology, affirming that we should think of poetry as 
philosophy. The project concludes with an appendix that attempts to demonstrate the 
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Thoughts on Poetry 
Chapter One: Language and Information-Giving 
 
43. For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which we 
employ the word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language game.1 
 
This has baffled me for years. What baffled me was the “though not 
for all” which comes to: For another class of cases not. Now what 
classes are those? I think it must be so for words in poetry…poetry, 
one might say, is off the ground, a flight from Earth, from particular 
need and circumstance. It belongs, one might say, to an altogether 




Abstract: In the first part of this three-part project can be found a description of two 
competing accounts of language: referent theory, and meaning-is-use. While the latter 
seems a more complete picture on the whole, one must wonder: does it account for all the 




1. A Beginning 
 
Our journey together is going to be a strange one – this I’ll readily admit. On it, 
there are two things I will occasionally ask of you: to imagine, and to walk with me. I 
believe these are the flour and eggs of good philosophy, and hope you’re not opposed to 
humouring me in this. If you are doubting already, however, then I’m afraid that this 
journey will be wasted on you – read no further. If, however, you can now picture 
yourself sitting in the back of a noisy classroom, the round, rich scent of your daily coffee 
warming your tired mind, then, “Welcome.” This is for you. 
For you, I begin with a story: 
 																																																								
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 
 
2 O.K. Bouwsma, “1968 Notes” In Notes on Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, 1965-1975. 
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Buzzing circles of student doctors poured over anatomical charts while the 
specimens brought into the lab rustled and chirped. Someone to the left of me 
sharpened his gleaming silver scalpel conspicuously – he admired its bright edge 
over his steaming coffee and stale morning muffin. My eyes were not on the well-
worn chart in front of me, nor my blade, but were trained on the instructing 
surgeon as she too prepared her tools—gently, lovingly—under the glaring 
fluorescent lights. Something about this day felt different, despite the familiar stink 
of fresh formaldehyde that filled my nostrils, the sharp stench replacing the 
comforting warmth of my daily dark roast. Called to order, the lecture hushed. The 
room, as usual, was filled with silence, coffee, and formaldehyde – and yet, 
something was different. 
 
The surgeon took her place at the front of the room: “There is much to learn from 
close and careful analysis.” She articulated each word carefully, her bright teeth 
hissing over each ‘s’, “It is my great hope that, someday soon, the truth will be 
discovered thanks to what we have practiced here.” As was customary (they told 
us, “necessary”), the specimens were being distributed still live, and mine was 
handed over just as the surgeon concluded her speech.  
 
A small, red-breasted bird was placed on the gleaming surface in front of me – it 
preened its clipped wings, pausing to cock its head in my direction. Its bright black 
eyes seemed to regard me, and the creature made a hesitating little hop in my 
direction. It seemed to be considering—what exactly, I couldn’t say—I leaned in 
closer, and it seemed to lean toward me… before suddenly breaking into a shrill 
song.  
 
The unexpected noise so startled me that I scraped my chair backward with a 
painful, grating sound that caused a head to whirl around in the row in front of me, 
a quizzical eyebrow thrown in my direction. Clearing my throat around something 
suddenly stuck there, I broke eye contact with the bird as its song continued to 
burst forth in an impressive soprano. With a cough that was half embarrassment, 
half something else, I shuffled through my papers, glaring at the songbird as it 
trilled with increasing insistence. I remarked aloud about the nature of the tune and 
quickly scribbled something across my lab report – the head hesitatingly turned 
back around. 
 
The melody echoed throughout the room and I cleared my throat again, a curious 
sensation stinging the corners of my eyes as they darted from the unknowing 
creature, down to my lab report, and back to the front of the classroom. The 
surgeon, who had begun the lecture, raised her voice over the disruption and 
demonstrated with a swift, elegant motion how to most efficiently end the lives in 
front of us. The buzzing started up again as her motions were mimicked with 
varying precision; while some thrusts went deep and other cuts just scraped the 
surface, each one effectively drained the life out of its startled target. As I took my 
scalpel roughly in hand, my eyes swept hesitatingly back to the songbird, which 
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had not yet ceased to sing. The small black eyes peered intently into mine, and I 
knew that I could be a surgeon no more. Never was one. 
 
The creature singing in my hands, I burst from the back of the lecture room where 
a truly gruesome scene was now taking place. My feet pounded the linoleum of the 
hallway as together we fled through pair after pair of heavy double-doors before 
hurdling out into the sunlight. I spread wide my fingers: “You are free!” I cried. 
But the bird did not fly. 
 
Why did the bird not fly? Not because its wings had been clipped, as the story 
describes, but because it was not, in fact, a bird at all. The story I’ve told you is not a lie, 
but neither is it exactly true. You see, it uses language in a particular way. It is a kind of 
riddle: a metaphor, an extended one, which compares something that is “not a bird at all” 
to a bird. This something that is like a bird, but is not a bird, is poetry. 
 
2. Language and Information-Giving 
 
“What could this mean?” 
From time to time I will imagine you saying things like, “What could this mean?” 
I imagine that I’m anticipating your reaction, though at times I’m likely to be wrong. 
Much of this project will be getting things wrong, but I think there’s something about that 
that’s right. So, “What could this mean?” I imagine you saying. You will learn as you get 
to know me that it is not in my nature to give explanations of things like metaphors, 
however, in order for you to understand why this is the case, I feel I must do so now. “A 
metaphor is most basically described as an instance of figurative language wherein one 
thing is likened to another.” This is a particular kind of answer. 
There was a time not so long ago when I was a particular kind of student, doing a 
particular kind of work. The assumption behind this work was something like this: 
language contains information. This is hardly deniable – language contains information. 
	 4 
What kind of information it contains and how precisely this information is conveyed, 
however, aren’t such certainties. 
There are those that think this way: language is composed of statements. 
Statements (sometimes also referred to as propositions) are sentences that represent states 
of affairs in the world. In this representational theory, statements give information about 
the actual world, representing it either as it actually is, or as it is not. Statements are said 
to do this in a particular sort of way; namely, through the conjoining of a subject with a 
predicate. The subject, either a proper noun or a descriptive phrase, is assumed to name 
something in the world. The predicate, or what is said of the subject, either represents the 
subject as it is actually found—in which case it says something true—or represents it 
otherwise—in which case the statement proposes a false picture. All statements may 
therefore be evaluated as being either true or false, and only statements, in their potential 
to be true or false representations of the world, are meaningful. 
This is a compelling explanation, particularly when we consider how it is most of 
us learn to use language: 
1. Cum ipsi (majores homines) appellabant rem aliquam, et 
cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, 
videbam, et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod 
sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere. Hoc autem eos velle 
ex motu corporis aperiebatur: tamquam verbis naturalibus 
omnium gentium, quae fiunt vultu et nutu oculorum, 
ceterorumque membrorum actu, et sonitu vocis indicante 
affectionem animi in petendis, habendis, rejiciendis, 
fugiendisve rebus. Ita verba in variis sententiis locis suis 
posita, et crebro audita, quarum rerum signa essent, paulatim 
colligebam, measque jam voluntates, edomito in eis signis 
ore, per haec enuntiabam.3 																																																								
3  “When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I 
perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they 
meant to point it out. This, how- ever, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all 
peoples, the language that by means of facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements 
	 5 
 
Applied to written language in particular, it would seem to be the case that any statement 
in a passage, article, or poem, then, may be analyzed in regards to its representational 
potential for truth and falsity, its meaning thus interpreted. Thinking this way, the critic 
of language becomes a surgeon, carefully carving up sentences and dissecting their parts 
in order to obtain information. Why should I—should anyone—take issue with this 
picture? Well, there are those who believe that language isn’t separable from how it is 
used. Says Wittgenstein of the above theory of language: 
3. Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of 
communication; only not everything that we call language is 
this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the 
question arises “Is this an appropriate description or not?” 
The answer is: “Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this 
narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what 
you were claiming to describe.”4 
 
And of meaning as use: 
 
43. For a large class of cases--though not for all--in which 
we employ the word meaning it can be defined thus: the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language game.5 
 
If what Wittgenstein says is correct, the statements in a novel, then, cannot be stripped 
from the work and stretched across the operating table. Instead, the sentences must be 
analyzed in their context: who said it, and to whom? For what purpose, and in what 
place? In this way, language becomes something dependent on language-speakers. 																																																																																																																																																																					
of the limbs and the tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, 
or rejects, or recoils from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what 
things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. 
And once I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my wishes.”  St. Augustine 
in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1959, Aphorism 1. 
 




Suddenly our talk of statements becomes an incomplete picture as we consider all the 
other ways that linguistic acts are performed. Language contains, not just a potential for 
representation, but a wealth of potential information expressed through particular use. 
Language is a living creature, or perhaps many living creatures, and therefore ought to be 
studied live: 
23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say 
assertion, question, and command? –There are countless 
kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 
“symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is 
not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of 
languages, new language-games, as we may say, come into 
existence, and others become obsolete and forgotten. (We 
can get a rough picture of this from the changes in 
mathematics.) 
 
Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of 
an activity, or of a form of life. 
 
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following 
examples, and in others: 
Giving orders, and obeying them— 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its 
measurements— 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)— 
Reporting an event— 
Speculating about an event— 
Forming and testing a hypothesis— 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and 
diagrams— 
… 
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in 
language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of 
words and sentence, with what logicians have said about the 







If one wishes to gain knowledge about the nature and ways of a wild creature, one ought 
not kill it, stretch it across a table, and then throw it into a jar of brine; what is gained in 
this way is not at all what was meant to be attained, but something else entirely. If you 
wish to know the nature of an animal, would you not be better off to observe it in its 
natural habitat? To describe its motions, perhaps to paint its portrait? As says 
Wittgenstein, “Here one can only describe and say: this is what human life is like”.7 
Thinking this way, the critic of language becomes a zoologist. 
There are other creatures of language, however, that are not to be studied even in 
this way. Again, as says Wittgenstein, “For a large class of cases--though not for all…” It 
seems to me that one of these creatures, these not-for-all cases, is poetry. The metaphor 
explained (the riddle answered): our songbird is poetry. Though the above list of 
language-games is by no means complete, we might notice that poetry does not appear on 
it—nor would its addition be proper. “Why do you say this?” It has to do with the fact 
that poetry, by its very nature, is not information-giving. In order to explain what I mean 
by this, it is necessary to first say more about our subject. 
 
3. What is Poetry? (Where Definitions Cannot Be Given) 
 
What is poetry? More urgently, what is it to ask, “What is poetry”? This might 
seem a strange question, but it is the very strangeness of the question that makes our 
asking it imperative. It seems to me that a distinction ought to be drawn, for there are two 
things someone could mean by such a question: first, they may be wondering about form.  
In asking, “What is poetry?” they may be asking about the structure of a poem – the 																																																								
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 
New York: Macmillan Company, 1959, Aphorism 121. 	
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necessary rhythm and number of lines. Must a poem be about nature, must it rhyme? 
What is it that makes a thing a poem instead of something else? It may alternatively be 
that someone is wondering about a poem’s function: “What is it that a poem does?” Does 
a poem describe? Does a poem have to mean something? Does a poem reveal truth? 
Regardless, to ask, “What is poetry?” is to expect an answer. Never mind the kind of 
answer given—is an answer in either of these two scenarios warranted? Let us consider 
(considering is not unlike imagining): 
In answer to the first case, it seems to me that someone may try to give a 
definition. This may seem proper, for surely there are some things that we call poems and 
some things that we don’t. The great difficulty in giving an answer here, however, is that 
poems don’t seem to have one common form. What definition could be given that would 
include both The Iliad and Hamlet? I wonder, what definition could encompass both 
Matsuo Basho’s “Autumn Moonlight”8 and Ogden Nash’s “The Panther”9; Beethoven’s 
Für Elise, snow falling in the lamplight, and the word repeated: ‘blackberry’? This is a 
strange list, and another incomplete one—it seems to me that ‘poem’ may properly 
denote a great number of (surprising) things—does it also seem this way to you? 
Still, someone may try. They would only have to open up a dictionary to claim it 
could be done. However, though it may be possible to give a list of characteristics that 
some or even many of these works share, it seems to me that these characteristics should 
not (indeed, cannot) be taken as necessary or sufficient conditions; though ‘poetry’ may 																																																								
8 “Autumn moonlight—/a worm digs silently/into the chestnut.” Matsuo Basho, “Autumn 
Moonlight,” Translated by Robert Hass, Poetry.net, STANDS4 LLC, 2016. Web. 1 Feb. 2016.  	 9	“The panther is like a leopard,/Except it hasn't been peppered./Should you behold a 
panther crouch,/Prepare to say Ouch./Better yet, if called by a panther,/Don't anther.” Ogden 
Nash, “The Panther,” Poetry Foundation, Web. 1 Feb. 2016.  
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be looked up in a dictionary, to read the entry is not to learn what poetry is, or what 
poems are. Nevertheless, many have attempted to define poetry: 
Poetry is literature written in meter; verse.10 
 
Poetry is an art form in which human language is used for 
its aesthetic qualities in addition to, or instead of, its 
notional and semantic content.11 
 
Poetry is writing that formulates a concentrated imaginative 
awareness of experience in language chosen and arranged 
to create a specific emotional response through meaning, 
sound, and rhythm.12 
 
Poetry is a literary work in which special intensity is given 
to the expression of feelings and ideas by the use of 
distinctive style and rhythm; poems collectively or as a 
genre of literature.13 
 
Which of these definitions is best? Should they be combined? It does not matter, for 
regardless, I am quite sure that one could always find another sort of poem and ask, “Yes, 
but what about this?” When it comes to form, then, it seems to me that a definite answer 
to our question might not be proper.14 If a definite answer is not warranted in this first 
case, what about in the second?  
																																																								
10 The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Farlex, Inc. 2003-2016. Web. 8 Mar. 2016. 	
11 Poetry.org, “What is Poetry?” 2005. Web. 3 Mar. 2016. 
 
12 Merriam-Webster, Web. 28 Feb. 2016. 
 
13 Oxford Dictionaries, Web. 28 Feb. 2016. 
 
14 There are those that have realized the absurdity of asking for a definition of poetry—
most of them, unsurprisingly, poets. The “definitions” they give are of a different kind—
sometimes paradoxical, often flippant, and nearly always poems in their own right—and are for 
this reason not considered here. 
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In order to answer the question of function, one would have to enter into a 
particular kind of investigation: how is one to determine what it is a poem does? It seems 
to me that this investigator would likely turn to a discussion of poetry as language. 
To do this, however, would be to assume that the language inside of a poem 
operates in the same way as language does outside of it – it would be to take for granted 
that poetry is a language-game. What if it is not? 
While one must understand the multiplicity of uses a word has outside of a poem 
to understand it inside of one, once placed inside a poem, a word undergoes a departure 
from its associated language-game(s). A word is no longer a particular piece on a 
particular board, but becomes all the pieces in one, divorced from all boards. A word in a 
poem contains all its earthly uses, but is itself a flight from earth. This is part of the magic 
of a poem: that like Wittgenstein’s “duck-rabbit” the words in a poem seem to change 
depending on how you look at them. This is why I said before that poetry is not in the 
business of information-giving. 
It seems to me, then, that while a straightforward investigation of a poem’s 
language may lead to answers, these answers are liable to reveal very little—or nothing at 
all—about poetry and what it really is. Note that what I have not said is this: any answer 
in this second case is also not warranted. How this can be I will soon demonstrate. 
Indeed, the rest of this project will be devoted to this second version of the question, 
“What is poetry?” 
“How do we begin?” 
With unlearning. Here is what I propose: that we begin with what poetry is not 
before we ask ourselves what it is. The next section of this project will, therefore, be a 
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“traditional” investigation of the language of poetry – together you and I will take on 
characters engaged in something I claim we should not do, for the purpose of discovering 
first-hand how the language of poetry is different from ordinary language. It will require 
your patience and your imagination, but if you choose to walk with me you may unlearn 
many falsehoods that have long been thought of as truths. From there, we will change our 
characters once more and attempt something entirely different.  
Our journey together is going to be a strange one, this I’ll admit. What the rest of 
this journey will look like, however, I dare not yet say. Instead I ask for your imagination, 
and if you’ve given it to me, then I hope you’ll now imagine my extended hand: 






























Thoughts on Poetry 
Chapter Two: The Language of Poetry 
 
One must start out with error and covert it into truth. 
That is, one must reveal the source of error, otherwise, 
hearing the truth won’t do any good. The truth cannot force 
its way in when something else is occupying its place.15 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he 
has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must 
so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed  
up on it.) 16 
 
 
Abstract: When it comes to the language of poetry, there are three fundamental 
questions that we may be tempted to ask; namely, whether or not the sentences in poetry 
are statements, whether or not they can be bearers of truth-value, and whether or not they 
are meaningful. To ask these questions, however, is to misunderstand the nature of 
poetry. Instead of asking these questions of poetry, we might instead ask ourselves if 
perhaps we aren’t mistaken about what these sorts of questions may accomplish. 
 
 
1. What Can Be Said 
 
Following from what I said before, it occurs to me that there are two sorts of 
people who might be motivated to give an account of the language of poetry: one such 
person may have a great love for the intricacies of language, and, finding poetic language 
at once strange and enchanting, may have a great desire to study its mysteries. I imagine 
this investigator nestled snuggly into his American leather armchair by the dusty firelight, 
an ancient volume propped open in one hand.  
																																																								
15  Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough," In Philosophical 
Investigations, 1912-1951, edited by James Carl Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. 
 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philisophicus, London: Kegan Paul, 1922, 
6.54.	
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Our second character, I imagine, rather wishes that poetry would either just 
explain itself or disappear altogether. He tears at his hair and paces across the room 
before throwing himself onto a threadbare sofa – “What does it mean? What does it 
mean!” – quite dramatic of him, really. It further strikes me that I am not sure which of 
these represents the Philosopher and which the Poet. 
Regardless of which I am and which you are, here we find ourselves. Imagine that 
we sit together in either of the rooms above (I won’t tell which one I chose if you won’t). 
What is there to be said about poetry? About the language of poetry? It would seem that 
we start with at least this assumption: that there is something about it that makes it 
peculiar, that makes it different from ordinary speech. We might begin, therefore, by 
asking ourselves in what ways that may be. 
If you’re in a mind to play along, you might now imagine yourself leaning back, 
fingertips pressed together in patient expectancy. I make the following suggestion – it 
seems to me that, when we ordinarily speak of language, there are three questions that we 
are in the habit of asking. They are: (1) whether or not speakers use language to make 
statements, (2) whether or not the sentences speakers utter can be bearers of truth-value, 
and (3) whether or not those sentences are meaningful.  
“Why these questions, and what do they have in common?” 
An answer like this is sometimes given: statements are the most essential part of 
language; they represent states of affairs in the world and may therefore be evaluated as 
either true or false; only statements, in their potential for truth or falsity, are meaningful. 
Refraining from commenting on this characterization, let us ask these questions of poetry 
and see what they reveal, beginning with the first: 
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2. Does Poetry Make Statements? 
Language, as we ordinarily use it, is composed at least partially of statements. 
These are collections of words arranged according to the rules of grammar that come 
together to declare the relevant content in such a way that they may be evaluated as being 
either true or false. Regarding how precisely this content is expressed, talk of words as 
‘signs’ tends to follow: words, as signs, signify or refer to something. This may be a 
material something which belongs to the world of mice and men, or it may be an 
immaterial, abstract something like an emotion, or a mathematical equation (both of 
which belong to strange other-worlds, indeed).  
These words, these nouns and verbs, must be woven together by means of various 
copulas, this being a critical part of how they come to be statements. Words alone, after 
all, though they may denote objects in this or the next world, can hardly be said to 
express much at all if not joined together in the appropriate way as they are uttered. 
Now, when these statements are then understood in the context in which they are 
spoken, it is only then that they come to express what I have called the relevant content, 
which no doubt calls to mind other words like ‘intended’ or ‘intention’. That is correct, 
for what these statements express is the specific intention of their speaker – the listener 
understands the statements as representative of this intention, and it is then that the 
listener knows what to make of the utterance and what is being asked of him (for he is 
being called on to do something, you know). This game of intend and interpret has rules 
specific to the circumstances of what is spoken, and so, in this way, language participants 
operate with a very particular shared understanding.17 																																																								
17 A distinction is sometimes drawn here between what a word refers to and its sense. 
Further talk of sense, or a word’s intension, however, we will save for our discussion of meaning. 
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An example of a statement might therefore be something like, “My teacup is 
empty,” spoken in the context of me to you in one of the above drawing rooms – 
whichever you chose. ‘My’ designates ownership and the relationship between the cup 
and me; ‘teacup’ designates the cup itself; we may evaluate how my statement 
corresponds to the actual state of affairs in order to say something about truth or falsity; 
and so on. What is most important is that the utterance and the context, understood 
together, supply for you how you ought to interpret what my statement as a whole means. 
For example, it may be the case that I am asking simply for your acknowledgement of the 
empty teacup, or it may be that I am actually requesting my cup be refilled, since you are 
topping off your own, anyway. Regardless, this is the way that we understand such 
utterances as these – these statements – within their place in the world. 
I wonder, however, what we would we say about a sentence like: 
anyone lived in a pretty how town 
(with up so floating many bells down) 
spring summer autumn winter 
he sang his didn’t he danced his did.18 
 
I’ll let you in on this much: the sentence comes from a poem. Poems, we will come to 
see, play by a different set of rules than the kinds we see governing ordinary exchanges in 
language.  
This particular sentence does not follow the rules governing statements in a few, 
instantly noticeable ways: first, it does not lay flat as a good sentence ought to, but is 
broken up into four lines – the sentence falls off at the ends, and then stacks itself one 
line upon another! It does not contain capital letters where it ought to, nor does it contain 																																																								
18 e.e. Cummings, "anyone lived in a pretty how town," In Complete Poems 1904-1962, 
edited by George J. Firmage. Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1926. 
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proper punctuation. These are structural differences, but there are differences in 
denotation as well: to what could ‘how town’, ‘many bells’, or ‘his didn’t’ refer? To what 
could any of it refer? 
“But surely the words refer to something? How, otherwise, could we understand 
them to mean anything?” 
One sort of answer is this: If we insist that the words must refer in order to mean, 
we would have to admit that they refer to things that do not exist in our world, for as we 
know, there is no actual, one thing that ‘how town’ designates. “What is it to say that a 
word refers to something that does not exist in our world?” 
Let’s speculate: If the words in the poem refer to something, but that something 
does not exist in our world, perhaps the words refer to another world. Perhaps, if the 
poem is speaking of a ‘how town’, it is the case that these and the other words of the 
poem denote objects in a fictional other-world. Perhaps this world exists in the 
imagination, created from impressions of the real world – you could imagine someone 
saying this. 
“This example,” I picture you interjecting, “is a very particular instance of poetry 
– surely not all poems speak of such nonsensical things as ‘how towns’; surely some 
sentences in poetry refer just as sentences outside of it do – to things that we do find in 
our world, as you say.”  
Exploring this thought, let’s look at the sentences below: 
To the trackless forest wild, 
To the loneliest abode; 
O! the heart is reconciled, 
That has felt oppression’s load! 
The desert place is bright, 
The wilderness is fair, 
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If hope but shed her light, - 
If freedom be but there.19 
 
“This poem,” you might say, having turned to it quite by accident in some dusty text,20 
“This poem speaks of the forest. Does ‘forest’ not refer to a thing in our world?” 
These sentences (and sentences like them) appear as though they refer. If 
someone were to try to look for what is doing the denoting, however, one would quickly 
see that ‘forest’ is not being used as a proper name, but rather that the phrase ‘the 
trackless forest wild’ is a descriptive phrase to be understood as a whole. This creates a 
difficulty. For if I asked you to go find ‘the trackless forest wild’ it may be the case that 
you could find an example of something like it – at least you could find yourself in a 
forest and claim that it was, “quite trackless, quite trackless indeed,” but still, how are we 
to know if this is the forest of McLachlan? Quite simply, it would not be – it could not 
be. 
You could conceive of someone saying: We can imagine the trackless wild, even 
if we cannot find it. We could imagine the loneliest place, the wilderness fair. Perhaps it 
is the case that what these words refer to is an idea, just as the ‘how town’ was. If you 
still do not like this talk of words referring to ideal places, perhaps you could instead by 
sympathetic to an answer like this:  
‘The trackless forest wild’ of the poem does not refer to any place, real or 
imaginary. Rather, it refers to the impression given by a place. It is the essence of a place, 
the feel of a place, the mood of a place that the words in the poem refer to. 																																																								
19 Alexander McLachlan, “O! come to the greenwood shade,” in The Penguin Book of 
Canadian Verse, Edited by Ralph Gustafson, Revised ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1967. 42. 
 
20 And it would have to be quite by accident, for the book you’ve picked up is a collection 
of Canadian poetry. 
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If you find this compelling, you might agree that ‘the loneliest abode’, then, does 
not designate a particular cabin high in the mountains, nor does it designate a 
hypothetical abode that we could imagine (I’ve imagined it as a cabin high in the 
woods…as you can see), but instead denotes the feeling of absolute loneliness, or the 
immensity of the silence found in a forest. Perhaps it is an experience that the words refer 
to; perhaps the statements in poetry are expressions of experiences. Let’s consider: 
I switch it on: the Master Switch in the whirring, ticking, smoke-
filled factory of my body. The machine lurches and grinds as 
warning sirens flash fire-red through the choking, charcoal smog. 
 
       —did they 
       make it to 
you? 
 
Radar blips and shadowed sightings, the wings of birds, 
and words carefully carved, “But still, there is always a 
way”. Though foreign and forlorn, the cry is raised: 
There is always a way. 
 
The metal groans as a gear somewhere gives, and the machine 
comes alive with a clanging hallelujah that echoes and 
emerges despite the efforts of the Override Valve. From my 
chest it’s all waves, Hallelujah, and Save My Soul.  
 
And the world  
is white.21 
 
How should we understand the above sentences? “A gear somewhere gives,” it 
says. Again we see that, if we were asked to find ‘the gear’, we would instead find 
ourselves in a pickle. Likewise, ‘the machine’ – what machine? 
If we understand the poem to be speaking of imaginary things, then we could try 
again to imagine the machine, as we did earlier with the loneliest place. Someone might 
say: reading the poem again, however, we see that the machine may not actually be a 																																																								
21 A.B. Gustafson, “The Machine.” 
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machine. If we imagined a machine, we would have missed the point; this poem is 
speaking metaphorically.22 
“What if we continued with our talk of impressions?” “And the world is white,” 
concludes the poem. If the words within the statement refer to neither the real world nor 
an imaginary one, then perhaps they refer to the experience of a white world. But what is 
the experience of a white world? What does a white world feel like? Are we to think of 
literal whiteness? Do we know how to evaluate whether this statement is true or false, or 
whether or not we have interpreted it correctly? Alas, what looked so promising before 
becomes a difficult container to fit poetry into.  
Stepping back from the problem of reference, here is another thought someone 
might have: perhaps our difficulty is stemming from looking at individual sentences 
within the poem. Without worrying about the implications, let’s ask, “Does the poem as a 
whole make a statement?” 
“Reading the poem again, we could give a statement about it.” We could give a 
summary of the poem. Is this the same thing as saying that the poem makes a statement? 
“It, as a whole, leaves a particular impression.” Is a poem reducible to a single 
impression? Why not simply write one word, ‘bad!’ and be done with it? 
At this point we likely both resemble the man in the second room, regardless of 
who or what we decided we were at the beginning of our inquiry. We are no closer to 
deciding whether or not poetry refers, and if it does, how it does this. Where are we to 
look for these statements if this other question cannot be answered?  																																																								
22 I told you before that it was not in my nature to give explanations of things like 
metaphors, and now I find myself presented with the opportunity to tell you why this is so: to 
explain the metaphor is to translate a sentence in a poem into the language of information-giving, 
turning the sentence into something that it is not—namely, a statement (or more likely, several 
statements). I will spend more time soon expanding on my reasons for this aversion. 
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I regret that I have led you on, my friend. I will now do something rather strange 
and say: Do not look for statements. 
“What do you say?” 
If what one is trying to do is understand poetry, one should not look for 
statements. When faced with a poem, one should not look for references or referents and 
where they may or may not lie. In fact, to engage in the above is to misunderstand poetry 
entirely, productive though such a discussion may appear to be (there is a type of person 
who desires nothing more than answers). 
Let me explain: The rules of poetic language are actually very different from 
those that we are used to. The first rule, it seems to me, is just that: “Do not look for 
statements.” What the language of poetry invites us to do is simply this: to engage with it 
as poetry and to see it as what it is, not to look past it. The difference is in focus. What 
our attention ought to be drawn to is the awe of the language itself – nothing else. The 
poem, simply put, states nothing. 
Thus, there is no use asking whether or not poetry makes statements. Instead, 
what we might say of the poem (if we had to say something) is this: it simply is. The 
poem, if it can be said to be doing anything, is being. You may not yet see what I mean - 
can someone learn how to read a poem? This I am not sure, but I am sure that you can 
unlearn what you have learned before (I am, of course, speaking of our three questions), 
and in the unlearning the greatest damage in undone. 
I will therefore repeat that the first rule is this: 
1. Do not look for statements. 
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“That seems to leave us in a rough spot, indeed, for what more can we say about 
poetry then? It was said before that only statements can be evaluated as either true or 
false, and that only in their potential for truth or falsity can they be said to mean! If we 
are not to look for statements, what can be said about truth? What can be said about 
meaning?” I say that the second and third rules of poetry are: 
2. Do not look for truth. 
3. Do not look for meaning. 
“I begin to suspect that you chose not to be the Philosopher, but to be the Poet!” I 
tell you that I am both, and that they are one and the same. To say more now, however, 
would take us into the final portion of this project too soon, and for this reason I hesitate 
to confide more. 
After all, all that we have learned before takes time to unlearn. For this reason I 
will proceed carefully and slowly that we may unlearn together—my unlearning has 
taken much time; even now I fight the old ways. Let’s remove ourselves from the rooms I 
described in the introduction, for a false picture did I paint of both philosophers and 
poets, a false dichotomy between philosophy and poetry. The poet-philosopher is most 
comfortable without walls around her, so let’s take our conversation outside. The crisp 
air, the molten leaves – imagine you and me picking our way through autumn trees. 
I’ve given the rules that we may keep them in mind. What is the next question 
that we have been taught to ask? Let’s walk on: 
3. Can Poetry Be True? 
“What should we say about the question of truth?” 
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If we are not to look for statements, talking about truth seems an impossibility, at 
least insofar as we understand it in relation to statements. It appears, then, that we are 
faced with two options: either we must find a new way to think about truth in poetic 
language, or we must not look for truth at all – let’s not walk too quickly, though. 
I said before that statements are collections of words arranged according to the 
rules of grammar, which come together to declare the relevant content in such a way that 
they may be evaluated as being either true or false. By this, it is sometimes meant that 
either the statement represents what it speaks of as it actually is, in which case the 
statement is true, or it does not, in which case it is false. An example of this might 
therefore be demonstrated with an evaluation of the statement, “The reader of this essay 
is imagining himself or herself walking with me.” If it is the case that you, the reader in 
question, is doing just this, then the statement is true. If you are not, then the statement is 
false. Simple enough. 
“Yes. All this talk of true and false does hinge on the evaluation of statements. If 
we are not to look for statements in poetry, as you say, or say that the poem is a statement 
in and of itself, how do you suggest we talk about truth in connection with a poem?” 
Well, we could think of truth in other ways.  
A move like this could be made: we could say that the sentences in a poem are 
true if they represent what the poet truly believes. Regarding our latest example, we 
would say, “It is true that, ‘From [the poet’s] chest it’s all waves, Hallelujah, and Save 
My Soul,’ if the poet believes it to be true.” This would imply that the poet is the source 
of truth, and that a poet must believe what they write (or else the poem is false, or, we 
might even say, a lie). 
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In what way must the poet believe what they write? Must the author of the above 
poem believe literally that waves are coming from her chest? We want to say no, or we 
would be inclined to say that all poets are delusional - perhaps we’re inclined to say that, 
anyway. No, when we say that a poet must believe what they write, we think we’re 
talking about something like good faith, or authenticity. A poet must represent 
themselves honestly in their work. Speaking this way, we begin to shift from talking 
about statements or sentences as bearers of truth and instead locate the truth within the 
poem, taken as a whole. 
Saying that a poet must represent themselves honestly with their poem is one way 
to talk about an entire poem as the bearer of truth. Another way to do this, still speaking 
of truth as authenticity, is to say conversely that the poem must faithfully represent what 
the poet intended it to represent, and if it does, then it can be said to be true. 
For every poem, then, should we be asking ourselves either, “Is the poet 
represented faithfully in the poem?” or “Is this poem what the poet intended it to be?” 
There are buildings full of people in colleges around the world devoted to this question, 
and what a many lonesome hours must be spent there. How many such people languish 
away wondering about the minds of long-dead men and women, trying to see through the 
words in front of them? Trying to see through the dank earth and into mouldy caskets. 
Even if we have the good fortune to be reading a poem by a live poet, asking about the 
author’s intention directs our focus far, far away.  
I’ll show you what I mean – hold this paper out in front of you. Look at the 
words, and their shape, and the whiteness of the negative space around them. Then – and 
you’ll have to wait till you’ve read the rest of my directions – shift your gaze to just 
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behind the paper, to the wall, or to the glazed-over eyes of your colleague. What does 
doing so tell you about these words? 
“Alright then, truth shouldn’t be looked for behind the poem. You’ve much to say 
about shifting focus; is it into the poem that you want us to look next?” 
Yes. There is a second way we could think of truth, and that involves looking 
inside of the poem. It involves thinking of non-logical truth. 
The great trouble with this approach is that non-logical truth falls within the realm 
of the ineffable. While ineffability is not misplaced in connection with poetry, to try and 
say more about the nature of this truth would be a grave error indeed.23 Which is why I 
will not say more now. Instead, I say that we would be better off not looking for any sort 
of truth in poetry at all. 
This is not to say that poetry does not say anything true, but rather that the search 
for truth will not bring truth (perhaps the truth lies in the understanding). I quote: 
A person travels for many days to the Himalayas to seek the 
word of an Indian holy man meditating in an isolated cave. 
Tired from his journey, but eager and expectant that his quest is 
about to reach fulfillment, he asks the sage, “What is the 
meaning of life?” After a long pause, the sage opens his eyes 
and says, “Life is a fountain.” “What do you mean life is a 
fountain?” barks the questioner. “I have just traveled thousands 
of miles to hear your words, and all you have to tell me is that? 
That’s ridiculous.” The sage then looks up from the floor of the 
cave and says, “You mean it’s not a fountain?” In a variant of 
the story, he replies, “So it’s not a fountain.”24 
																																																								
23 I say this because non-logical truths are, at “best”, not able to be captured adequately 
by a single (or possibly even multiple) proposition(s); at “worst”, they cannot (and therefore 
should not) be put into words at all. 	
 24 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981. 571. 
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This is how it is with all non-logical truths. “Then you hold that there are truths in 
poetry?” Perhaps, perhaps not. That is all I will say—perhaps, perhaps not. Whether there 
is or is not this kind of truth to be found, I repeat that it is a mistake to look for it. The 
second rule of poetry is, then: 
2. Do not look for truth. 
I am imagining that we’ve been stopped in front of a stream for some time now, 
and have been speaking in low voices, our breaths falling from us as we stare out at the 
spaces in between the branches. We stand with our hands in our pockets, our noses and 
chins frosty with our escaped breath. You are silent for some time before you murmur, 
“Because to do so is to misunderstand poetry, you will say.” If you are still playing along, 
I hope you will imagine yourself saying this; what I mean to do is un-teach, and to be un-
taught you must imagine.  
“Because to do so is to misunderstand poetry, you will say.” Yes. The point of a 
poem is not to suggest truths, just as neither is it the point of a poem to mean: 
 
A poem should be equal to: 
Not true. 
 
For all the history of grief 
An empty doorway and a maple leaf. 
 
For love 
The leaning grasses and two lights above the sea— 
 
A poem should not mean    
But be.25 
 
This is another road we ought to go down as long as you don’t mind doubling back – the 
day is not yet gone and we’ve nowhere to be. Are you imagining us carrying on? 																																																								
25Archibald MacLeish, "Ars Poetica," In Collected Poems 1917-1982, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1985. 
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4. Does Poetry Mean? 
“A Poem should not mean/But be.” Just because it is not the point of a poem to 
mean does not mean (I dodge your sharp glance) that there are not those who will still 
search meaning in a poem. There are those that try, and some of them begin in this way: 
In order to discover whether or not poetry means, we might first ask ourselves how it is 
possible to mean. In order to do so we must ask: what do we mean by ‘mean’?  
Initially, it strikes me that we use ‘mean’ in connection with language in two 
different ways: denotation and connotation. Concerning the former, we might well 
remember all our talk of signs and referring. Regarding the latter, we are usually speaking 
of the sense of the word, or of its intension, as I mentioned so briefly before. 
We have said that denotation has no home inside of a poem; it is not correct to 
look for references or referents in connection with poetry. What more are we to say about 
denotation, then? Perhaps more, but it would be a fruitless endeavour – this much I hope I 
have un-taught at least in part. Therefore, let us consider what a word or sentence in a 
poem may connote as we again practice shifting our focus inward. 
When he told me he loved me, he said it with an inhale, 
As though he could breathe the words back in. 
 
I saw those words in his eyes, 
Reflections of cigarette-like smoke 
Disappearing back into the black hole 
Of his open lips in half-time.26 
 
That’s a curious image, speaking while breathing in. Anyone who has tried it knows how 
impossible (or undignified if managed) it is to do such a thing. Perhaps in thinking this, 
however, we take the words too literally, and are slipping back into recalling the actions, 																																																								
26 A.B. Gustafson, “Inhale.” 
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etc. that they denote. This type of language, perhaps, should not be understood literally, 
but metaphorically. 
If this is the case, what can we say about how the words mean? 
This is one way: though the words in the poem, literally interpreted, say one 
thing, we should take them (together, in a sentence) to mean another. If this is the case, 
then the poet is doing something curious indeed when they write, and interpreting a poem 
becomes something of a puzzle. We must look past the words of the poem and suppose 
what they could mean—we must make guesses and put forth theories. How are we to 
guess what someone means when they do not say what they mean? How are we to know 
if we have guessed correctly? 
We could think of this language is like this: the connotation of one word is meant 
to affect how another word is understood; in a metaphorical phrase we should think of 
one word in light of another. For example: “I saw those words in his eyes,/ reflections of 
cigarette-like smoke.” If this phrase is understood metaphorically then we should do 
something like think of ‘words’ as though they had the intension of ‘smoke’ – in this case 
the words become something floating, dark, reflected. The connotation of the latter part 
of the phrase is transported and applied to the former, and in this way we see that there is 
a transplantation of senses occurring.  
‘Mean’ as a transplantation of senses – as promising as the above explanation 
may sound to some, I must ask: is this how we use ‘mean’ in our every-day usage of the 
word? I am, of course, thinking of Wittgenstein here; perhaps this is the point in our 
exploration where we might “try on” meaning-is-use by thinking of the ways that we 
ordinarily use ‘mean’ in connection with ‘poem’ or ‘poetry’. 
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“What does this poem mean?” 
When we use ‘mean’ in this way, it is as though we are asking for a summary. We 
want an explanation of the poem and what it intends to convey as a whole. We expect 
that there is some message contained within, and we want to know what it is. We want a 
straight-forward answer. While it may seem to be the case that an explanation of this sort 
can elucidate the hidden features of a poem, this is not so. Imagine asking someone, 
“What does this poem mean?” and having them tell you about the intricacies of the 
allusions and the symbolism contained within. “Ah,” you say, “I understand the poem 
better now,” but you do not. You understand the words spoken by your ‘translator’; your 
understanding of the poem, if it has changed at all, has lessened. You have understood the 
poem as though it was, or was part of, a language-game. 
“What was this poem meant for?” 
Here we are speaking of an artist’s intention and returning our focus to the poet. 
What was her purpose in writing this piece – what did she want us to understand? What 
did she wish it to convey? This use of ‘mean’ is like the above use of ‘mean’ in that, 
when we speak this way, we are asking for a statement in plain language. The words of 
the poem have been lost on us. 
“This poem means that, somewhere, there is a poet,” or perhaps, “His giving me a 
poem means that he cares for me.” 
When we speak in this way we speak of the poem only “in passing,” as it were. 
While this is no doubt a way to use ‘mean’ in connection with a poem, it tells us next to 
nothing about the poem itself. These phrases mention the poem only as it is a 
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consequence of something else, and in this way remove the poem to the corner of our 
vision. 
“This poem means something to me. This poem is meaningful.” 
Ah, and in a few, short utterances we have returned to the Land of the Ineffable. 
Tell me, how am I to explain what “When he told me he loved me, he said it with an 
inhale,/As though he could breathe the words back in,” means to me? What sort of 
sentence would you have me put together and offer up to you, what poor sacrifice would 
you have me make to those would-be gods, precision and certainty? I do not speak their 
language and they are no gods of mine. What would you have me say about: 
All the new thinking is about loss. 
In this it resembles all the old thinking. 
The idea, for example, that each particular erases 
the luminous clarity of a general idea. That the clown- 
faced woodpecker probing the dead sculpted trunk 
of that black birch is, by his presence, 
some tragic falling off from a first world 
of undivided light. Or the other notion that, 
because there is in this world no one thing 
to which the bramble of blackberry corresponds, 
a word is elegy to what it signifies.27 
 
What would you tell me about what this poem means to you? You may guess what I will 
say about that – you should not try, and I would not ask you to. Meaning and 
meaningfulness are like Truth. When we read a poem, there may be something about it 
that strikes us to our core. There is something that makes us give pause, and after the 
pause, we feel we must read the poem again – and again, and again. We want to live 
inside of it, but find that we already do – we look inside the poem and we are already 
there. As you can see, talk of meaning and meaningfulness has a tendency to turn into 
poetry (“Perhaps, perhaps not”). Returning to the question, what kind of statement could 																																																								
27 Robert Hass, "Meditation at Lagunitas," In Praise, Harper Collins Publishers, 1979. 
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I give you about what this poem means to me? “This poem means something to me.” 
“What?” “I don’t know.” 
If pressed, that is the most I would say. That is proper, that “I don’t know.” It says 
both that I am not sure and that, even if I was, I would not know how to say it. I would 
have to read the poem to you and look at you hard, and hope that you knew. This sort of 
meaning is not sought, but simply found or not found —“Perhaps, perhaps not.” This is 
why I say, 
3. Do not look for meaning. 
By this time it is dusk and the setting sun has burned the leaves down to small, 
glowing embers. They shoot stars like sparks into the sky. I am imagining that you and I 
are walking quietly away from the wild place and back through town, back to the warm, 
closed room in which we began. My mind is elsewhere – in that bramble of blackberry – 
and yours is imagining, thinking about what it is to unlearn, wondering how much there 
is to unlearn. 
5. What Cannot Be Said (Can Be Shown) 
We have returned to our study or our library (I can’t recall now what it was 
described as in the beginning of this essay); we sit with the leather and the ancient 
volumes and the luminescent bulbs around us. We are warm and dry. Everything is as we 
have left it, but we are not the same. We have brought with us something of the wild. 
If we are not to look for statements, truth, or meaning, what is left to be said of a 
poem? Surely, there are questions that one may ask – we know that better than most. 
Does it not seem likely, however, that any investigation you can think of in connection 
with poetry, I will caution you not to pursue?  
	 32 
“Why, when one has read a poem, must he say something?”28 
This may seem a rather strange thing for someone to say who has just spent so 
many pages on poetry. But what I have meant to do is show you what is actually strange; 
to surprise you; to show you the bricks so that you might question how and why the room 
was built. Of what is our study made? For what purpose have we built this? I imagine you 
know that I think we should not be here; we should be in the wild. From the same poem I 
most recently showed you: 
We talked about it late last night and in the voice 
of my friend, there was a thin wire of grief, a tone 
almost querulous. After a while I understood that, 
talking this way, everything dissolves: justice, 
pine, hair, woman, you and I. There was a woman 
I made love to and I remembered how, holding 
her small shoulders in my hands sometimes, 
I felt a violent wonder at her presence 
like a thirst for salt, for my childhood river 
with its island willows, silly music from the pleasure boat, 
muddy places where we caught the little orange-silver fish 
called pumpkinseed. It hardly had to do with her. 
Longing, we say, because desire is full 
of endless distances. I must have been the same to her. 
But I remember so much, the way her hands dismantled bread, 
the thing her father said that hurt her, what 
she dreamed. There are moments when the body is as numinous 
as words, days that are the good flesh continuing. 
Such tenderness, those afternoons and evenings, 
saying blackberry, blackberry, blackberry. 29 
  
I will not and cannot explain what the poem means, whether or not it contains 
statements, or how we may evaluate it for truth. I can only show what I have shown. Can 
someone be taught how to think of a poem? They can unlearn what they have previously 																																																								
28 O.K. Bouwsma, "Poetry Becomes Truth." In Toward a New Sensibility: Essays of O.K. 
Bouwsma, edited by J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982. 
 
29 Robert Hass, "Meditation at Lagunitas," In Praise, Harper Collins Publishers, 1979. 
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been taught. Can someone be taught how to read a poem? I do not know, but they can be 
asked to read it again. Regarding all similar questions, all I will say is, “Blackberry, 
blackberry, blackberry.” 
This is to say, “There are some things that cannot be said.” What cannot be said, 





























Thoughts on Poetry 
Chapter Three: Poetry Becomes Philosophy, Philosophy Becomes Poetry30 
 
What is a question?” –Is it the statement that I do not know 
such-and-such, or the statement that I wish the other person 
would tell me…? Or is it the description of my mental state of 
uncertainty? –And is the cry “Help!” such a description? 31 
 
[It’s] colors we can’t quite see…It’s about anger and the 




Abstract: Just as before, when we asked ourselves if perhaps we weren’t mistaken about 
what our current investigative approach might accomplish in connection with poetry, we 
must now ask ourselves the same question in a larger context. When it comes to 
philosophy, is it possible that our current methodology does not actually serve the 
purpose it was designed for? Or could it be that this purpose is itself misguided? In this 




1. The Question 
 
Questions – there’s the place we should begin again. 
I should forewarn you that the particular path I now invite you to follow me down 
has been long neglected and is mightily overgrown. Overgrown, and full of dangers 
should we stray too far. We will stray, though – like Carroll’s Alice, we must stray: “Of 
what is our study made?” This is something I asked you before. So come now, my friend: 
“For what purpose have we built this?” 
																																																								
30 This title I owe to Dr. Ronald E. Hustwit, my mentor, who gave to me as a present the 
work of his own mentor, Bouwsma, from whom I borrow the words: “The title of what I am 
about to read I owe to a colleague. He gave it to me as a present.” O.K. Bouwsma, "Poetry 
Becomes Truth," In Toward a New Sensibility: Essays of O.K. Bouwsma, edited by J. L. Craft and 
Ronald E. Hustwit. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. 
 31	Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 
New York: Macmillan Company, 1959. Aphorism 24. 	 32		Benjamin Abercrombie, in conversation with the author, February 6, 2016.	
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Some will say that philosophy is the discovery of the truth. Or they will not say it 
outright, but this is what they practice.  
You know me well enough now to know that I’m terribly prone to imagining 
(fatally so, some may say). Imagine with me, then, a possible world wherein certainty is 
the aim (we may not have to use very much imagination after all; if we are Alice, then 
this is Wonderland). Within this world, it is thought of questions that they are asked in 
order to be answered, which is a fearful mistake. A fearfully common mistake, I might 
add. Within this possible world it is often asked, “What is a question?” “It is the type of 
utterance made to illicit an answer,” is the reply, and twice with one sentence a grave 
error has been made. And it is a grave error. I believe whole-heartedly that each time the 
above occurs, the question, the very idea of a question, the very purpose of questioning, 
has been extraordinarily misunderstood. 
The purpose of philosophy was once proposed to be the investigation of the 
expression, “What is being?” You’ll notice that I’ve used ‘expression’ and not ‘question’, 
which may seem another rather strange thing – how full of them I am!  
As delicately as possible, I say that this is because “What is being?” does not so 
much ask what being is as it expresses wonderment in the face of being. With each 
instance of this expression we pronounce the marvel, awe, and terror of finding ourselves 
alive in the world. “How wonderful,” we cry, “how wonderful and dreadful is it all!” Our 
question, “What is being?” is actually an expression of the curious, flickering light we 
find inside ourselves, crying out against the terrible, roaring winds of All Else. 




“How wonderful,” we cry— 
“How wonderful and dreadful is it all!”  
 
Our questions are the expressions  
of the curious, flickering light we find  
inside ourselves,  
crying out against the terrible, roaring winds  
of All Else. 
 
No, you would not be wrong. For what other sort of language could preserve the mystery 
and strangeness of being? I put this question to you: if the expression of the wonder of 
being is the proper goal of philosophy, and the language of wonder is poetry, could it be 
that what poetry is, is philosophy? 
2. On What Cannot Be Said (Poetry Becomes Philosophy) 
Let’s consider: 
We said before that poetry is not in the business of giving information as other 
language is, and for this reason it is not subject to the same kind of analysis as ordinary 
language – this we have together discovered. As such, poetry succeeds where other 
language fails; namely in maintaining the proper mystery of the question, “What is 
being?” 
“What is this proper mystery, and how is it, exactly, that poetry successfully 
preserves it?” 
Regarding the mystery: there is something about being, about finding ourselves in 
the world, that is notoriously difficult to put to words. “Notoriously difficult – why 
should this be so?” 
Some believe that it needn’t be. To come up with a theory of being: that has been 
the goal of philosophy for thousands of years. “Of what is ‘being’ made? What sorts of 
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things ‘are’? Of what is experience made? What is ‘experience’? What is 
experienceable?” 
These questions—whatever they are, however they are asked, however we come 
to understand them—are merely preludes to answers. And indeed, answers are given. 
Theories are made (“What makes for a good theory of “being”?). The one question that is 
not asked: “Is an answer warranted?” 
If an answer is not warranted, then why are answers so often given? Well, to think 
that there is no answer to the question…why, how would we stand it? In the grand 
scheme of it all, where then would we stand? How would we know? All the answers—
what would become of them—of us? 
If these questions ring of existential anxiety it is because they are grappling with 
both the immensity and finitude of our being in the world. Still, answers are continually 
both sought and given. Why should this present such a problem? 
The difficulty with answering questions that are actually expressions of wonder is 
similar to the difficulty we encountered earlier, in our discussion of giving answers in 
regards to questions about the language of poetry. In giving answers to questions 
regarding being, we are neglecting being altogether; we attempt to center our focus on 
being as we search behind it, next to it, under it.  
You’ll have expected this, my Alice: to ask these questions of being (expecting an 
answer) is to misunderstand what being is. It is not separable, explainable – we can 
neither focus on nor shift our focus from it. We can be, and be amazed at our being, and 
that is right. That is all a part of what being is. Being becomes wonder, wonder becomes 
being. 
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“What then, are we to go about wondering, wandering through the maze, 
marveling at the roses? Where does poetry come into that – why is it that poetry is ‘the 
language of being’?” 
Poetry is the essential wonder expressed in the question. Or rather, it is and it is 
not – it may be or it may not be. Within a poem is contained an immensity and a finitude; 
within a poem is nothing of the sort; frankly, I don’t know what a poem contains. “[It’s] 
colors we can’t quite see…It’s about anger and the sound a hollow container makes.”33 
I said before that poetry, if it can be said to be doing anything, is being. It simply 
is. Poetry is the exploration of the question without the hindrance of information-giving. 
Poetry, the creature in the shadows, the pit in the bottom of your stomach, says of being 
(and is itself something like): 
I’ve never known much  
about science ‘cept I  
like the sounds it makes, the 
pictures it creates. Like 
‘fission’ and like ‘fusion’,  
‘compound’ and ‘solution’.  
 
The beauty of ‘contusion’, the  
purples, red, and blues and the 
darkness of ‘dark matter’  
come together in a pattern, a  
painter’s smock all splattered, the 
stars at night all scattered, 
 
circling and expanding, 
commanding, reprimanding – a 
voice made of light, in a 
pulsing, quaking, night. And 
we are made of stars, of  
Pluto and of Mars. We are 																																																								33 I’m again grateful to Ben Abercrombie, a marvelous poet—and philosopher, though he 
doesn’t yet know it—for this beautiful line. 	
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pounding, writhing vessels, 
bursting, spewing blood cells 
tearing into ourselves, a 
strange science after all – not  
quite science at all. No, 
not quite science at all.34 
 
“What does all this mean?” I hardly know. Why do you ask me, “What does all this 
mean?” If you want an answer, then: the language of poetry, by its very essence (as not 
information-giving), is able to explore being without asserting what being is or isn’t like. 
This is what I meant when I said that poetry maintains proper mystery. Blackberry, 
blackberry, blackberry, I’ll then add, with a sheepish grin. A wolfish grin? “So it’s not a 
fountain.” 
3. Interlude: The Philosopher, the Poet 
We’ll pause here – there’s a break in the maze and I was never one to wander 
until lost (this is a lie). As you rest in the soft grass I confess this to you, “this is a lie,” 
and make another confession: 
What I said before about the goal of philosophy was perhaps unfair. I 
characterized philosophy in a particular sort of way that was perhaps more of a caricature 
than a true portrait. This was done with the same purpose as one might draw a caricature 
– the features that are most prominent are exaggerated in order to make their strangeness 
plain. 
You might well remember my earlier characterizations of the philosopher and the 
poet from the previous chapter. “Which is the philosopher, and which the poet?” I said. “I 
say that they are neither, and that they are one and the same.” I am thinking along these 
lines now. 																																																								
34 A.B. Gustafson, “Strange Science.” 
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Who is the philosopher? It seems to me that, above all, he is a lover of wisdom. 
The philosopher’s aim in discovering the truth (if this is his aim) is to see things as they 
really are, and perhaps to eventually represent this truth to the world that they too may 
see. Who is the poet? The poet sees at night that which is only seen by day. She is a lover 
of the strange and the ordinary, and recognizes each in the other. Perhaps this is the same 
as saying that the poet is a lover of wisdom; perhaps it is not. 
If it is, then might it be that the philosopher and the poet can be one and the same? 
Might it be that what philosophers love is in poetry? Not just in poetry – but is poetry? 
A final confession: I would be lying again, my friend, if I told you that I knew the 
path from here. This pause is here so that I might catch my breath before plunging blindly 
on. What follows is the most difficult part of my project, and for that reason in particular 
I’ve stopped us both here and now. The following section is what gives the project its 
name – they are my thoughts, fragmented and imperfect, tracing the path where I think 
that I can see it. The great trouble with what-cannot-be-said is…just that. 
4. On What Can Be Shown (Philosophy Becomes Poetry) 
To see at night that which is only seen by day. How strange… 
Poetry has an uncanny ability to reveal strangeness. It can take as its subject what 
is most common and show it in a new light. Poetry uncovers the extraordinary in that 
which seems to us to be the most ordinary aspects of life—is this a kind of wisdom? 
It seems to me that, in this way, a poem is a little like a photograph… 
Like a still-frame, a poem captures a moment of being and spreads it out in front 
of us. In the snapshot nothing is asserted to be true or false, nothing is meant. The poem 
is being suspended in time, held in front of us like a photograph. In the stillness of the 
	 42 
moment the wonder of our existence is made apparent where it was not before, as 
snippets of life are delicately extracted from the stream of being in the world. 
A moment of being suspended in time. Wonder eternal… 
We dove into the creek as children 
And came up weighed down 
Heavier somehow 
In the water’s lesser gravity 
That night the sun set on a changed world 
Remember how we cried when I left? 
How I cried that night we got so high? 
And when we came down I felt a change 
I felt 
Heavier somehow 
So I held you close  
  (I held you down)35 
 
Similarly, poetry takes as its subject what is most plain and shows how it is 
beautiful. The ability to find beauty in anything, even that which is most plain or most 
ugly—is this a kind of wisdom? 
I am reminded here of music… 
A poem is not just a thing read, but also sometimes a thing spoken. A poem 
naturally has a rhythm, but it also has a melody. The words of the poem are the notes, and 
the speaker’s voice becomes an instrument – these two combined lend the poem a 
musicality unique to where and when it is played, and by whom. A poem has many lives.  
There is something beautiful about language that is so often lost in the search for 
truth or meaning. Something beautiful about the tone and timbre of a human voice, even 
as it speaks of what is plain or ugly. In the ordinary words there are trills and chirps; in 
the tremble of a human voice is contained the immensity and the finitude. 
																																																								
35 A.B. Gustafson, “That Summer.” 
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Even when speaking words that sound harsh with all their consonants, or with a 
voice that betrays pain with each tremor, beauty can be found. 
This morning I woke from a dream 
That a parasite 
Was making its way through my sole 
And my heel. 
 
Frantic fingers groped against skin 
But it continued, unheeding 
Gnawing through my soft flesh 
Burrowing into that, my one  
Most sensitive place 
 
My estranged father flew to me—it was for him I cried— 
Bit by bit he dug out the thing 
Carving through sections of my flesh  
His surgeon’s hands soon sopping with gore 
 
But the great length was so entangled 
With the tendons and sinews 
That he could not tell where it ended and I began 
He continued the excavation 
Though I screamed that it was not the parasite 
But that it was me, still 
He pursued his dark mission single-mindedly. 
 
I awoke to a pounding pulse 
 
The anguish was still there, so real 
That in the hazy morning light 
I could almost make out his shape 
Folding the dusty sunbeams  
Into empty, twisting shadows 
 
I snatched off the covers 
That I might inspect the offending foot 
Finding my sole empty 
I thought to call my father— 
 
I placed my hand where his had been 
The warmth of the sun 
Was the warmth of his fingers 
Or the warmth of blood 
I remembered studying those hands as a child— 
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I would imitate the smooth, stern lines his pen would make 
I modeled my letters after his own. 
 
But I did not call.36 
 
Conversely, poetry has a way of discovering what is darkest or most unpleasant in 
that which at first seems to us to be most beautiful. Is this too a kind of wisdom? 
with his sweat he baptized my neck 
traitorous shivers dripping, dripping, dripping 
down my spine 
his panting breath was hot and wet 
his mouth treacherous, beckoning 
fingertips turned into claws 
pressing into throat, sliding over jaw 
tangled and pulling chin over shoulder— 
his eyes were those of a cornered beast 
frenzied mouths met 
the panic rose up like bile in my throat 
his kiss, not human, aimed to devour 
I bit down hard, metallic red filling my mouth 
Fear and loathing clouded his animal eyes 
I bared my teeth in a foaming, crimson snarl— 
we’re both predators, baby 
and this is kill or be killed37 
 
All of this, it seems to me, has to do with what can be shown – with strangeness. 
Seeing at night that which is only seen by day. It has something to do with white roses 
painted red… 
All strangeness, all mystery. As our journey draws to a close and I lead you back 
to the rabbit hole you so accidentally fell down (for me, there is no leaving), there is one 
thing left to be said: “How are we to understand it all?” 
 
 																																																								
36 A.B. Gustafson, “Parasites of the Sole.” 
 
37 A.B. Gustafson, “where, wolf?” 
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5. An Ending 
To understand a poem is something like this: A wry smile and a nod. Says 
Wittgenstein in regards to music and understanding, “You could say too that in so far as 
people understand it, they “resonate” in harmony with it, respond to it. You might say: 
the work of art does not aim to convey something else, just itself.” 
Though Wittgenstein speaks of a piece of music, or of art, I can’t help but think 
that it is the same with a poem. What is it to understand a poem? It is to resonate in 
harmony with it. It is not to produce a proposition in response. To understand a poem is 
not to be able to give a summary of it, nor to be able to replace one sentence in a poem 
with another (if poetry is like music, one cannot change the notes and still call it the same 
song), nor really to say anything at all (“Why, when one has read a poem, must he say 
something?”38). 
Now, what is it to understand poetry in general? Perhaps it is something similar. 
Understanding poetry requires imagination, an inclination to wander, and a good deal of 
patience. To understand poetry is to allow it to reverberate, and for you yourself to 
resonate. To understand poetry is to hear the notes and the chord all at once, and to place 
yourself harmoniously in and among them. 
That is a poem, then, and that is poetry. Our last question—how are we to 
understand this? This, said in so many words and pages? 
Here is what I have to say about that: You may take it or leave it – ideally you 
will do something of both. I cannot help but feel that the words are poor and grasping, but 																																																								
38 O.K.	 Bouwsma,	 "Poetry	 Becomes	 Truth."	 In	 Toward	 a	 New	 Sensibility:	 Essays	 of	 O.K.	
Bouwsma,	edited	by	J.	L.	Craft	and	Ronald	E.	Hustwit,	271.	Lincoln,	Nebraska:	University	of	Nebraska	Press,	1982. 	
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their goal has been to uncover a strangeness and a mystery. What you do with them now 
is up to you – as for me, there is so much more to unlearn. About poetry, there is 
infinitely more to say, though very little of it is proper to say. That which is proper, I can 
hardly now do justice. Unlearning takes time.  
What, then? Then I must part with you, my friend, who has humoured me this 
long, with your imagining and your walking, though our parting won’t be for forever. No, 






































I was once told that the great dream of the poet is to express thoughts without words. 
Whether that be the case or no, it has become my dream. 
 
I wrestled often with the goal of this project, feeling particularly toward its end like I was 
saying too much, or trying to say what shouldn’t and couldn’t be said. In the final weeks I 
would become increasingly frustrated, man-handling the words in the final section, trying 
to make them do what they weren’t made to do. Eventually, I realized that I had to let 
them go—they are not ready and perhaps neither am I. There is, at times, too much said 
here, and also a great deal left unsaid (or rather, unshown). This is what it is to unlearn. 
 
Therefore I add this appendix as a different sort of attempt to describe what it is that 






The letters I wrote never made it far past my fingers. I drew a picture of you, folded it 
into an airplane, and made a wish as the wind took it away instead— 
 
I wake up to the whitewashed walls of my little white apartment and take my little 
white pills. White ceiling, white fan, white mug of dark black coffee. 
 
—tell me, did it make it to you? 
 
Paper-plane wishes and large-frame glasses, letters that end with hanging sentences— 
I set sail corked, glass bottles across eddying waves. Inside, these hand-scrawled notes to 
Please, Save My Soul— 
 
I switch it on: the Master Switch in the whirring, ticking, smoke-filled factory of 
my body. The machine lurches and grinds as warning sirens flash fire-red through 
the choking, charcoal smog. 
 
—did they make it to you? 
 
Radar blips and shadowed sightings, the wings of birds, and words carefully carved, “But 
still, there is always a way”. Though foreign and forlorn, the cry is raised: There is 
always a way. 
 
The metal groans as a gear somewhere gives, and the machine comes alive with a 
clanging hallelujah that echoes and emerges despite the efforts of the Override 
Valve. From my chest its all waves, Hallelujah, and Save My Soul.  
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When he told me he loved me, he said it with an inhale, 
As though he could breathe  
the words back in. 
 
I saw those words in his eyes, 
reflections of cigarette-like smoke 
disappearing back  
into the black hole 
of his open lips in half-time. 
 
That black abyss, shuddering, flapping, 
reminded me of a reel of film being re-wound 
before counting back down to nothing  
but scratches and dust—no,  
less than nothing—projected nothing. 
 
In his eyes I saw my lips smile and part, 
a glint of fangs that sunk in deep 
before blowing back, with a biting kiss, 






I’ve never known much  
about science ‘cept I  
like the sounds it makes, the 
pictures it creates. Like 
‘fission’ and like ‘fusion’,  
‘compound’ and ‘solution’.  
 
The beauty of ‘contusion’, the  
purples, red, and blues and the 
darkness of ‘dark matter’  
come together in a pattern, a  
painter’s smock all splattered, the 
stars at night all scattered, 
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circling and expanding, 
commanding, reprimanding – a 
voice made of light, in a 
pulsing, quaking, night. And 
we are made of stars, of  
Pluto and of Mars. We are 
 
pounding, writhing vessels, 
bursting, spewing blood cells 
tearing into ourselves, a 
strange science after all – not  
quite science at all. No, 






We dove into the creek as children 
And came up weighed down 
Heavier somehow 
In the water’s lesser gravity 
That night the sun set on a changed world 
Remember how we cried when I left? 
How I cried that night we got so high? 
And when we came down I felt a change 
I felt 
Heavier somehow 
So I held you close  




Parasites of the Sole 
 
This morning I woke from a dream 
That a parasite 
Was making its way through my sole 
And my heel. 
 
Frantic fingers groped against skin 
But it continued, unheeding 
Gnawing through my soft flesh 
Burrowing into that, my one  
Most sensitive place 
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My estranged father flew to me—it was for him I cried— 
Bit by bit he dug out the thing 
Carving through sections of my flesh  
His surgeon’s hands soon sopping with gore 
 
But the great length was so entangled 
With the tendons and sinews 
That he could not tell where it ended and I began 
He continued the excavation 
Though I screamed that it was not the parasite 
But that it was me, still 
He pursued his dark mission single-mindedly. 
 
I awoke to a pounding pulse 
 
The anguish was still there, so real 
That in the hazy morning light 
I could almost make out his shape 
Folding the dusty sunbeams  
Into empty, twisting shadows 
 
I snatched off the covers 
That I might inspect the offending foot 
Finding my sole empty 
I thought to call my father— 
 
I placed my hand where his had been 
The warmth of the sun 
Was the warmth of his fingers 
Or the warmth of blood 
I remembered studying those hands as a child— 
I would imitate the smooth, stern lines his pen would make 
I modeled my letters after his own. 
 






with his sweat he baptized my neck 
traitorous shivers dripping, dripping, dripping 
down my spine 
his panting breath was hot and wet 
his mouth treacherous, beckoning 
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fingertips turned into claws 
pressing into throat, sliding over jaw 
tangled and pulling chin over shoulder— 
his eyes were those of a cornered beast 
frenzied mouths met 
the panic rose up like bile in my throat 
his kiss, not human, aimed to devour 
I bit down hard, metallic red filling my mouth 
Fear and loathing clouded his animal eyes 
I bared my teeth in a foaming, crimson snarl— 
we’re both predators, baby 




I don’t, no. 
 
Break easy, my love— 
Break the dawn and shake the rust 
Break my bones and breathe the dust 
Break your rules and slake your lust 
You try to take it slow 
To not go where I can’t go 
“Sometimes I wonder if you love me at all” 
I don’t know, I don’t know, I don’t know 
Break the “have to,” break the “must” 
Break my promise, break your trust 
Break your heart. Break it just—so: 






Sailing ships and pleated planes  
These are the ways I try and reach you 
  
My clumsy tongue trips over the words my fingers deftly fold  
A strange, stark substitute for a language long lost  
Or never learned  
 
Tender, delicate shapes pour from these ten tongues  
In the form of lines and creases  
 
A harsh breath from your lungs could rend them  
Send them spinning into piles of crushed, sculpted white  
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Heaped around a wire waste-basket  
 
I am tongue tied  




Sand and the Sea 
 
Last night I had the dream that I haven’t had in a long time 
My teeth fell out, one by one 
Just the sound of cracking porcelain 
I cupped my hands and caught them while they poured  
Out between my fingers, turning into sand 
 
As the granules swallowed me whole 
I choked on the broken pieces of the things  
That haunt me while I am awake 
Like, 
What kind of a woman am I? 
What kind of daughter 
And sister 
And lover am I 
When the words I speak 
Are cut by teeth 
That turn into grains that seep 
Through the cracks in my fingers and the floorboards when I sleep? 
 
I extracted the shards and they crumbled to dust 
That I built into mountains and castles 
Caressing the mounds into something 
Shaped a little more like something I could keep 
 
And that was enough 
When I awoke it was with peace, because I felt 
That the dream was a good one 
That 
These cutting teeth 
They still speak of belief 
And loss  
And love  
And all that is True in this life 
 
I may sleep tonight not knowing who I am 
Or what the dream means 
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But I’ll know how it feels to hold you at night 
I’ll know the bluest waters come after the blackest storms 
That the tide of love overflows and over-pours 
Seeping still through dusty floorboards 
 
For such is life 
And so it will be 
Though what that means I can’t say 
And what I’m made of, I can’t say 
Be it sand, or sea 
 
There isn’t much else I can say I know 
Because there isn’t much that we can know 
So I’ll sleep tonight not knowing who I am 
Or what the dream means 
 
But I’ll know love. 
 





















Can one be taught how to read a poem? They can be asked to read it again.  
 
Can one be taught how to understand a poem? Perhaps I could read the poem to you and 
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